The months after the parliamentary elections brought intense political wrangling from a number of external sources.  The reconciliation between Syria and Saudi Arabia was seen as a major milestone for the prospects of Lebanon, as the two nations are highly influential there. After the announcement of the successful formation of a cabinet to govern Lebanon, the plaudits came in from across the globe. Many hoped that the fledgling Hariri government would proceed on the issue of disarming Hizballah.

The United States in particular hoped that the Lebanon would finally get around to disarming the Shiite resistance in conjunction with United Nations Security Council resolution 1701,  which formally put an end to Hizballah’s 2006 war with Israel.

No government likes to have independent armies operating in their territory, but the issue is particularly sensitive in Lebanon. Hizballah is the only group that has remained fully armed after the end of the civil war. Hizballah justifies its continued military capabilities by portraying itself as the only force capable of defending Lebanon from Israel.

This argument is valid to many Lebanese who still have fresh in their minds memories of Israel’s invasions in 1982 and 2006. The first time ,Israel stayed for 18 years, the next time only 34 days. The Lebanese might say that if Hizballah wasn’t there, they would be occupied by Israel, at least up to the Litani River. Israelis would counter that if Hizballah wasn’t around, they would have no reason to invade. It’s tough to tell who is right.

But this argument misses the point. Even if Israel did not maintain a hostile posture towards Lebanon (I write “towards Lebanon” because Israeli officials have stated publicly that they will hold all of Lebanon accountable for the actions  of Hizballah), the issue would still present a difficult problem for the Lebanese government. The question is whether anyone is capable of disarming them and if so, at what cost?

Hizballah’s military wing is highly trained and heavily armed. In May 2008, the government made a move to disable their communications network. Hizballah responded by swarming West Beirut in a show of force that quickly convinced the government to reconsider. It was the largest case of sectarian violence since the civil war ended.

Hizballah encountered relatively little resistance from Beirut security forces and it’s unclear whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would even take up arms against Hizballah on a large scale. It is likely that the LAF in such a situation would be routed and Lebanon would be plunged back in to the bad old days that everyone in the world had hoped it left behind.

So what do the Lebanse have to gain by the government taking on this extraordinarily risky task at this point? It took many weeks of intense political negotiations for Hariri to form a cabinet that was satisfactory to everyone. It is almost certain that the issue of Hizballah’s arms never came up during the talks.

For Hizballah, it’s a non-starter and for the Hariri-led majority it would have meant the end to any progress being made. This could be the reason that Hizballah officials stayed relatively quiet during the negotiations and didn’t fight for particular posts. From the beginning, they seemed to be on board with everything and the only hurdle to their accepting a cabinet list was that their March 8 Christian ally, Michael Aoun, was not getting his way with a particular cabinet post he wanted for his son-in-law. In the end, Hizballah came out with two relatively obscure cabinet assignments (agriculture ,and adminstrative development). It is certain that the situation would have evolved much differently for Hizballah had the issue of their arms come up in a meaningful way, and maybe all they wanted from the negotiations was to be left alone.

The government put the issue off indefinitely instead of risking, at best, endless political deadlock and, at worst, another civil war. For the Lebanese people, it is clear that this is a fight for another day, when Lebanon is far more stable, the LAF is far stronger, and Hariri has far more political capital to wield. Today however, Lebanon is making strides. Its banking and tourism sectors are flourishing, its economy seems to be weathering the global financial crisis nicely, and its government is finally functioning once again. While the United States and Israel may disagree, for now perhaps it’s best to let sleeping dogs lie.

]]> http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/18/hizballah-arms-issue-tabled-for-now/feed/ http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/11/lebanon-gets-a-cabinet/ http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/11/lebanon-gets-a-cabinet/#comments Wed, 11 Nov 2009 20:12:05 +0000 Patrick Vibert http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=692 After five months of fierce negotiations, Lebanon finally has a cabinet. Prime Minister Rafik Hariri announced Monday that the final details had been worked out and that parties had a come to an agreement.

Lebanon’s deep sectarian divides provided ample obstacles during the negotiation process, but many thought that the biggest barriers to a national unity government would come, not come from within Lebanon, but without.

Countries like Iran, Syria and Saudia Arabia  hold significant influence in Lebanon. Iran is the close patron of Hizballah, Rafik Hariri is close with the Saudi royal family and even has dual Saudi citizenship, and Syria remains a big player in Lebanon four years  after it’s decades long occupation ended in 2005.

Iran never appeared to stand in the way to the formation of a cabinet - at least not publicly - but it took a high profile summit to bury the hatchet between Damascus and Riyadh. The two have been at odds for the last few years, especially since the assassination of Saad Hariri, Rafik Hariri’s father, in a car bomb in 2005.

Like his son, Saad Hariri was also very close with the Saudi Royal family. Often  described as a larger than life figure, Hariri represented tremendous Saudi financial interests in Lebanon. His death dealt a deep blow to Saudi influence there, and many believed that Syria was behind the hit.

It seemed as though the lack of cooperation between the regimes in Damascus and Riyadh would translate directly to political stagnation in Beirut. That is why many found it so encouraging for Lebanon when the leaders of the two nations decided to meet last month and announced that neither would do anything to thwart the formation of a cabinet in Lebanon.

As for Tehran, it was largely quiet for its part. Iran had unexpectedly stumbled into a political turmoil after its elections and it seemed as though it had more pressing matters to tend to than to interfere in Lebanon to any significant degree. This was reflected in Hizballah’s cooperative stance throughout. Hizballah had agreed to the 15-10-5 format (15 cabinet seats for the majority, 10 seats for the opposition, and 5 seats for the president) early on, and they had made it evident  that, once the other parties had agreed to a deal,  Hizballah would not stand in  the way.

So with the external players agreeing to stay out of the way, the task was now left to the Lebanese. Some analysts believed that the external influences had been a stabilizing force in Lebanon, and that without their influence, it was unclear whether the Lebanese politicians could accomplish anything when left on their own.

Indeed, one of the final sticking points impeding the formation of the cabinet was Michael Aoun, the Christian leader of the Free Patriotic Movement. He wanted his son-in-law Gabran Bassil to takeover the telecommunications seat, but Hariri rejected this demand on the grounds that Bassil did not win the parliamentary seat in his district.  As time went by and Aoun refused to budge, the other obstacle to the formation of a cabinet seemed to melt away leaving only the disagreement between Aoun and Hariri. Eventually the two sides compromised, with Bassil getting a cabinet seat, just not the particular one that he wanted.

When the fight came down to this, neither side showed any sign of giving in to the other, because nobody wanted to lose face. It seemed like the last month of negotiations came down to this one single issue. But eventually Hariri and Aoun found a middle ground and were able to get past the last hurdle.

When the news was announced, the international community was quick to offer its support, albeit with qualifiers. The United States, France, and the United Nations offered praise for the progress  in Beirut, but it was immediately followed by wishes for adherence to UN resolutions and the disarmament of Hizballah.

But is this a constructive issue for Lebanon? Let us put aside the fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces are still very weak and that Hizballah is still the only entity in Lebanon capable of fending off an attack from Israel, and let us focus on what Lebanon has to gain through Hizballah giving up its weapons.

The governments of most sovereign nations maintain a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Lebanon however, as the result of a very long civil war and an even longer occupation by Israel, has developed a minority militia that is entrenched in its society and territory. Hizballah began as a resistance, but it eventually evolved into a militant, socio-political religious phenomenon, which is highly influential amongst the nation’s Shiites (who make up over a third of the population of Lebanon).

Hizballah is a state within a state and any attempt to disarm it, such as in May 2008, is met with extreme resistance. Another attempt now could be more destabilizing for Lebanon. While it’s clear that disarming Hizballah is important for the international community, especially the United States and Israel, it may not be as much of an issue to the Lebanese.  It’s quite possible that the average Lebanese would want  Hizballah to disarm, if only they could flip a switch and make it be so. But in reality it’s not that easy.

The issue is a non-starter for Hizballah, and if it came up during the formation of the cabinet, it’s certain that the whole process would have been derailed. That is why Mr. Hariri tabled the issue for a future date. This way he can get on with forming a government and maybe, if the time ever comes when he is strong enough to do so, he can take the issue up again. But until then, it just doesn’t mean as much to the Lebanese as it does the the West. So for now the issue is on hold indefinitely.

Also, some analysts are presenting the majority and the opposition in Lebanon as being cosmopolitan & liberal vs anti-Israel & anti-West, respectively. This may be an accurate characterization, but it misses the point. These ideas are not necessarily diametrically opposed to each other. Many Lebanese still harbor deep resentment towards Israel, and suspicion towards the West, particularly the United States. But many of these same people are proud of the modernity and the openness of Lebanon, especially when it come to business. These characteristics represent a huge cross-section of Lebanese,  and it is here where any progress will be made by the new government.

So now the real work begins: using the new unity government to improve the lives of the Lebanese people. The infrastructure of Lebanon needs to be improved. Corruption needs to be weeded out amongst the bureaucracy. The internet in Lebanon is still dreadfully slow.  Lebanon has hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. The army is weak. Beirut is severely congested with traffic. The national debt is among the worst in the world.

The list daunting, but the problems are solvable. For now congratulations continue to roll in and  many challenges lay ahead.

Hizballah has denied any ties to the weapons.

The weapons were being offloaded by the Israeli navy, and so far all of the  weapons were already known to be used by Hizballah. This information is important to the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) as it would  indicate no new military capabilities of Hizballah. The cargo reportedly contained mostly small arms and katyusha rockets.

Israel has tried to draw a straight line from Iran to  Hizballah with this confiscated shipment, saying that it had found  paperwork aboard thee ship indicating that it  had originated in Iran.

Iran is perhaps Israel’s staunchest enemy, and Israel has been claiming for years that Iran has been supplying Hizballah with weapons. In 2006, Israel fought a bloody and destructive 34-day war with Hizballah with arms that many believe originated in Iran, such as the C-802 Silkworm anti-ship missile that destroyed an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Beirut near the start of the conflict.

Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu claims that the weapons were “intended to hit Israeli cities”. While this may be an overstatement- the statement implies that the rockets would have been launched at Israel the moment that they ever made it into Hizballah hands- he has a point. During the 2006 War, Hizballah launched rockets from southern Lebanon that were reaching the northern Israeli port city of Haifa.The message was clear: we can hit your cities too.

So the value  of the rockets is not in their destructive capabilities - they are on the small side and are highly inaccurate - but in their deterrence.  Like bee stings, one at a time they are not destructive, but a barrage of 1000 can be lethal. The weapons are small, easy to transport, and easy to set up, which makes them near impossible to defend against.

The shipment, if it in fact was bound for Hizballah, tells us that they are probably going to be using similar weapons in the next war as they did in the last war. However, that is just what the situation “tells us”, and it doesn’t mean it’s true. Perhaps the weapons shipment was “discovered” on purpose, as to give the IDF the impression that Hizballah has the same old weapons and nothing more.

This is hard to believe. Hizballah officials have stated that if Israel tries to attack them in Lebanon again, that Hizballah would have some “surprises” for them. Last time, it was the shocking use of the Silkworm missile to dramatically destroy the IDF  warship parked off the coast of Beirut (a skillful showman, Nasrallah was live on television at the time and directed viewers attention to  the sea, where the missile was en route to the ship). Hizballah has had three years to resupply from 2006, and it’s certain that Nasrallah has some new tricks up his sleeve for the IDF.

The discovery of the alleged arms shipment to Hizballah also begs the question of why Iran would use the sea. The distance, by sea, from Tehran to Beirut is far longer than the distance from Tehran to Beirut overland, through Syria. And its much safer. There would be much less need to worry about prying eyes, considering the Iranian and Syrian governments would be in on it. The largest obstacle would be the Lebanese border, which may be controlled by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), but is hardly impossible to circumvent.

Instead the weapons were (allegedly) bound for Beirut by sea, where they would have to pass though international waters open to everyone, including the IDF. Also, the weapons would have to travel in a convoluted manner through North Africa, probably through Sudan, in order to avoid the tightly controlled Suez canal. So why not travel overland through Syria and avoid all the attention? All we con do at this point is speculate.

Presently, Israeli officials have not yet released the documents that they say prove the cargo was coming from Iran. And even if it was coming from Iran, the ship was captured off the coast of Cypress which hardly implicates Hizballah directly. So, unless more substantial proof is produced by Israel, it is likely that the international community will be suspicious of its claims.

For now, Israel may just have to be happy with taking many tons of weapons off the market that had a high likelihood of being used against them at some point, but it’s unlikely that we will ever know for sure who those weapons were bound for.

Syria and Saudia Arabia hold tremendous influence in Lebanon, and the frosty relations between them were seen as a one of the largest obstacles to Lebanon forming a working government, but the leaders of both nations met recently and reconciled their differences. So now, with everyone from Syria to Saudi Arabia to France to the United States on board, the only thing standing in Lebanon’s way is Lebanon itself.

Lebanon’s fractious political system is caused by its sectarian divisions, mostly split three ways between Sunni, Shia, and Maronite Christians.  The struggle between each group for supremacy was a main reason for Lebanon’s civil war, and now it’s the main reason for such consistent government gridlock.

Today there are two camps, one Sunnis and one Shia, with the Maronites split between them. Roughly half of the Maronites went with the Sunnis to form the pro-Western Saad Hairi-led March 14 coalition, while the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, led by Micheal Aoun, went with the Shia parties of Hizballah and Amal to form the pro-Syrian March 8  bloc. Negotiations between the two factions have been progressing slowly but steadily for the last few months.

President Suleiman has been acting as an independent arbiter throughout. Mr. Suleiman remained neutral throughout the parliamentary elections to convey that his administration would not be taking sides and that he would like a Lebanon governed by consensus rather than one party ruling over another.

Many meetings have taken place over the last few months to hammer out a cabinet makeup acceptable to all. The 15-10-5 cabinet seat distribution format has been agreed upon, with the ruling party getting the most seats, the opposition getting ten seats, and the president controlling five for himself to give his office sway over the balance of power.

The main sticking point in the negotiations, which arose  shortly after the elections, is the telecommunications seat.  Aoun wants the seat given to his son-in-law Gebran Bassil, but Hariri disagrees and both sides have been stubborn about the issue. Hariri is adamant that Bassil should not be given the post, as he did not win his district in the parliamentary elections. Aoun contends that winning one’s district is not a prerequisite for a cabinet post. Recently, Hariri allowed that Aoun’s party could have the telecommunications seat as long as he didn’t fill it with his son-in-law, but this offer was rejected.

Mr. Bassil said to Narharnet that the Free Patriotic Movement was for the quick formation of a cabinet, but was adamant about his party’s demands saying,  “We have a minimum level of demands which (Hariri) knows and we won’t relinquish them.” He added, “Let him give us our rights and the cabinet would be formed tomorrow.”

At this point, it’s hard to tell who is rightly holding out and who is just being stubborn. On one hand, Mr. Aoun’s demand seems to be the only remaining obstacle to Lebanon getting a government, as the external influencers have reconciled and most of the internal forces have been largely quiet. If he could just let this one thing go then Lebanon could form a government and get on with developing itself as a nation. On the other hand, maybe Mr. Hariri is the stickler. If he would just let Aoun fill the seat with whomever he wants, then everyone could get on with their lives.

The only thing for sure right now is that something has to give. The problem is that no one wants to relent and appear weak. A loss here would be tougher to swallow for Aoun, especially since he has made such a big deal of it. Hariri certainly wouldn’t enjoy a loss in this showdown, but it wouldn’t hurt him as much as it would Aoun, and he would look like a hero for delivering on his mission to form a government.

It’s strange that Lebanon is wallowing in stagnation over such a seemingly small issue, so there must be more going on here than meets the eye.

.

Lebanon received 180 out of 192 votes from the General Assembly, greatly surpassing the two-thirds majority needed for Security Council membership.

Advocates claim that Lebanon will bring an Arab voice of moderation to the Security Council, the international community’s most powerful decision-making body. Lebanon has a reputation for having one foot in the East and one foot in the West, and could give a unique voice and understanding to the needs of both.

However, not everyone agrees with this assessment. Critics characterize Lebanon as a fractured country, still nursing the wounds from its civil war. They point to a county plagued by violence, one that doesn’t even have a functioning government of its own, let alone a government that can project a unified voice on any pressing international issue.

There is evidence to support this. In 2005, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. In 2006, a war between Hizballah and Israel left the country in ruin. In 2008, Hizballah briefly took over half of the capital when the government tried to shut down its communications system. And the formation of Lebanon’s cabinet has been deadlocked since June.

Also, Lebanon is  involved in some of the worlds most complicated issues that the Security Council will be facing during its two year term.

Through its large Shiite population, Lebanon is closely linked with Iran, whose nuclear program has attracted much attention recently. Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations has stated that Lebanon supports Iran’s right to develop its own peaceful nuclear power capabilities, but respects the decisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN body tasked with monitoring countries’ nuclear power programs.

Another issue is that of the UN’s Hariri-murder probe. Syria, a main suspect in the case, still wields tremendous influence in Lebanon, especially amongst Hizballah and Amal. It’s not hard to imagine that this influence could have a negative effect on the investigation, or at least complicate it.

Lebanon is also deeply involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over 400,000 Palestinian refugees are thought to live in Lebanon, which shares a border with Israel. It’s likely that this will have a strong influence over how Lebanon proceeds with this matter in terms of its Security Council participation.

Over the years, Lebanon itself has been the subject of numerous Security Council resolutions. One of those resolutions, 1701, put a stop to the 2006 War and called for the demilitarization of Lebanese territory south of the Litani river. However, in the past six months there has been at least three alleged violations of the resolution by Hizballah.

Currently, these events are being investigated by UNIFIL (which has been active in Lebanon since 1978), the UN force tasked with keeping the peace (and insuring the demilitarization) of the designated area in South Lebanon, but it will be interesting to see how Lebanon’s involvement on the Security Council effects these matters.

Another complicating factor for Lebanon  is the mere presence of Hizballah in its political system. Hizballah is considered by some, including the United States, to be a terrorist organization. However, the voters must have taken the issue of Hizballah’s involvement in Lebanon’s government under consideration before voting, and if 180 out of 192 countries in the UN voted in favor of Lebanon, this could be seen as the international community indirectly legitimizing the movement’s existence.

There is no question that serving on the United Nations Security Council is a prestigious responsibility for the tiny nation, however it will be interesting to see how Lebanon proceeds on some of the most complicated of international affairs, many of which it is intimately involved.

Last month, Syrian President Bashar Assad traveled to Saudi Arabia to attend the opening ceremony of a new high-tech university, which had been a personal pet project of the King’s. There, President Assad extended an invitation for the King to come to Damascus.

The relationship between the two counties has been strained in recent years due to Syria’s suspected involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former Prime Minister of Lebanon with close ties to Riyadh.

Both nations wield significant influence in Lebanon, and their reconciliation  could relieve the political deadlock that has plagued the country since their falling out. The friction between the two is seen as a key reason for Lebanon’s lack of progress in forming a government.

Lebanon  has been without a governing cabinet since the June 7 parliamentary elections, where Saad Hariri’s March 14 coalition won the majority.

Lebanon’s President Michel Suleiman is expected to participate in the meetings, which could make the events more productive from a Lebanese standpoint.

There are also reports of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak possibly joining the meeting. Mubarak’s presence would deepen the summit’s historic feel, hearkening back to the days when  Nasr’s Egypt wielded tremendous influence in the region’s affairs.

Two of Lebanon’s most heated rivals, Prime Minister Saad Hariri and former General Michael Aoun are expected to meet for lunch today in Beirut on the subject of cabinet formation, but very little progress is expected to come until after the Saudi-Syrian summit.

The summit might  also signal a loosening of Syrian-Iranian ties, a relationship that the West has been trying to unravel for years. The possibility of Saudi investment dollars flooding Assad’s beleaguered nation could be extremely persuasive in that regard. Perhaps this is the first step toward the Syria-Iran-Lebanon triangle being replaced by the Saudi-Syria-Lebanon triangle.

Though the degree of foreign influence that plagues Lebanon is not desireable by any nation, one must chose the lesser of two evils  in this instance. If Iran is the odd man out and Saudi Arabia steps in, then at least the cooperation between Syria and Saudi Arabia could lead to an effective government being formed.

This is probably the best possible scenario for the people of Lebanon, because then and only then, with an effective government, will they be able to see significant progress in their great  nation.

]]> http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/10/07/saudi-syrian-summit-expected-this-week/feed/ http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/10/01/hundreds-of-lebanese-shiites-expelled-from-uae/ http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/10/01/hundreds-of-lebanese-shiites-expelled-from-uae/#comments Thu, 01 Oct 2009 22:13:17 +0000 Patrick Vibert http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=663 Scores of Lebanese Shiites have recently been expelled from the United Arab Emirates, allegedly for their refusal to inform on Hizballah.

The expulsion of the Lebanese nationals started after the June 7  parliamentary elections in Lebanon, but had not been widely known or reported on until the group went public.

Lebanon’s President Suleiman reportedly traveled to the Emirates to try to persuade officials to reconsider, but the trip was in vain.

The group reports that they were asked by UAE officials to spy on Hizballah , and that they were informed of their deportation after they refused. Palestinians  recently expelled from the UAE also report similar treatment when they refused to spy on Hamas.

Many of those expelled had lived in the UAE for most of their lives, and all deny supporting Hizballah.

Expatriates make up a significant portion of  the UAE’s population, including around 100,000 Lebanese.

The real reasons behind the mass expulsions are still unclear at this point.

Every one of the expelled has denied supporting Hizballah, but even if the charges are true, it begs the question of why would UAE officials suddenly care so much about it. After all, money flows freely from all of the Gulf nations to mosques and religious organizations of questionable intent. So why care about Hizballah, and why now?

At this point, it seems like there are three likely factors as to why Abu Dhabi (UAE capital) took these actions: a perceived internal threat from the nation’s Shiite population, a perceived external threat from growing Iranian influence in the Gulf,  pressure from the United States to disrupt any support for Hizballah, or some combination of the three.

Whatever the reason, it must be big.  Many of those expelled have lived peacefully and successfully in the UAE for decades. Some have built businesses that employ Emirati citizens who are predominantly Sunni. It’s very curious as to why the UAE officials would take such a perplexing and disruptive course of action which will effect many of their own citizens.

From Beirut’s Daily Star:

Hussein Masood, a 39-year-old businessman who had lived in the emirates since the age of 4, said he still did not understand what prompted his expulsion in July….“I have three companies there, $5 million worth of contracts and 85 mainly Sunni em­ployees who rely on me,” he added. “I can’t believe this is all happening because I am Shiite.”

There are many like Mr. Masood who only know life in the United Arab Emirates, and who have very little experience living in the country they were deported to. Whatever the reason for their expulsion, the lives that they have built  there are on hold indefinitely. For now, they can only  organize and prepare themselves for the long battle that lies ahead.

Both Syria and Saudi Arabia hold significant influence in Lebanon and their cooperation is seen as vital to the cabinet formation process. Saad Hariri, like his father Rafik before him, is very close with the regime in Riyadh, and Damascus maintains close ties with Hizballah and Amal.

According to Druze MP Walid Jumblatt, “There is no doubt that the meeting between King Abdullah and President Assad is a major political event that would restore contact between the two countries, although it has never been broken.”

The frosty relations between the two nations’  are considered by many to be the leading factor in the political gridlock that has gripped Lebanon for the last five years.

In 2005, Rafik Hariri, a man very close with the Saudi Arabia, as well as being a leading politician in Lebanon, was assassinated by car bomb in a plot widely credited to Syria. Syria has steadfastly denied any involvement, but its relationship with Saudi Arabia has suffered ever since.

In addition to Assad traveling to Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah is reportedly expected to visit Damascus in the coming days.

Saad Hariri has been trying to form a government ever since he was appointed prime minister in June, but as yet has been unsuccessful.

The political landscape in Lebanon is  difficult to navigate for even the most seasoned politician, and Hariri is no exception. There are many complex  relationships and alliances, both internally and externally, that must be considered in such  negotiations.  And even if Hizballah and Amal fall in line, that is no guarantee that the other obstacles, such a Free Patriotic Movement leader Michael Aoun will as well. However, closing the rift between Riyadh and Damascus could go a long way towards finally forming a cabinet to govern Lebanon.

Hariri submitted a list to the president for approval on September 8, but the proposal was rejected outright by the opposition because it was not formulated with their consent.

President Suleiman said he would not endorse a cabinet list unless it had opposition support.

Mr. Hariri stepped down the following week, but was reappointed prime minister by his allies in parliament. He then vowed to step up his efforts to resolve the issue.

One of the key sticking points in the opposition is that General Aoun, of the  Free Patriotic Movement, would like to appoint his son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, for the cabinet seat of the telecommunications chief.  Hariri has rejected this on the grounds the Mr. Bassil didn’t win his seat in parliament and therefore should not have a seat in the cabinet.

At least one thing appears to be decided: the distribution of the cabinet seats. The plan is to have 15 seats for Hariri’s March 14 majority, 10 seats for the March 8 minority, and 5 seats to be appointed by the president. There  seems to be a consensus on this.

It appears that the Lebanese government is once again in a state of paralysis, but that may only be the case at the moment. It must be remembered that this is a country divided by relegion in its very constitution, making negotiations extremely difficult for even the most experienced politician. Amongst other things, it will take time to make this happen, and its only been three months since the  parliamentary elections.

Also, Lebanon was without a government for 18 months from 2006 to 2008.  Maybe this will just be another phase in Lebanon’s national reconciliation. Or maybe this sort of political gridlock is the natural state of things here.

One things that is for sure is that nothing will change in Lebanon until the politicians fundamentally change they way the operate. Instead of just thinking about their clan, or party, or district, perhaps they should try thinking about what is good for all the Lebanese people.  In this case, it is a government that  works.

In the end, if an effective government is ever to be formed in Lebanon, the story of how it happened would not be written without two words: compromise and cooperation. Unfortunately, over the last 35 years, those words in Lebanon seem to have become haram.

The rockets that were fired into Israel landed outside residential areas, and no injuries were reported as a result. The return fire from Israel also landed in an unpopulated area resulting in no reported casualties.

Historically, Southern Lebanon has often been the scene of considerable violence between Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), but today both sides exercised sufficient restraint to prevent an escalation.

In 2006, a Hizballah border raid into Israel resulted in the IDF responding by bombing targets throughout Lebanon, including residential areas.

After the war was officially ended by UN Resolution 1701, the UNIFIL peacekeeping mandate was expanded and, though often tense, the border between Israel and Lebanon has be relatively quiet ever since.

Hizballah denied any involvement in the rocket attack, and Israeli officials stated that they held the Lebanese government responsible for preventing such attacks.

The UN condemned the attack on Israel, and the IDF has filed a formal complaint with UNIFIL on the matter.

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